vartor
21-05-2007, 17:52
>Simdiye kadar dis basinda okudugum en gercekci degerlendirmelerden biri.
>Okumanizi
>tavsiye ederim..
>
>Can secular Turkey survive democracy?
>How reformists can stop the Islamists who have chipped away at Turkey's
>secularism.
>By Ayaan Hirsi Ali, AYAAN HIRSI ALI, a former Dutch legislator and women's
>activist who now lives in the U.S., recently published her memoir,
>"Infidel."
>May 9, 2007
>
>
>SECULAR AND LIBERAL Turks have had a rude awakening from years of deep
>slumber. Kemal Ataturk's heritage is about to be destroyed - not by an
>invading power but from within, by fellow Turks who yearn for an Islamic
>state.
>
>Ever since Ataturk, Turkey has been divided into those who want to run
>state affairs on Islamic principles and those who want to keep Allah's will
>from the public space.
>
>The proponents of Islam in government, such as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
>Erdogan, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and their Justice and Development
>Party, have been remarkably successful. They have exploited the fact that
>you can use democratic means to erode democracy, employing a powerful
>strategy.
>
>Three pillars of that strategy are worth discussion.
>
>The first is Dawa, a tactic inspired by Islam's founder, Muhammad. Dawa
>means to preach Islam as a way of life, including a way of government,
>perpetually and with conviction. Every convert is obligated to preach Islam
>to others, creating a grass-roots movement.
>
>The secularists in Turkey underestimated this pillar and thus neglected
>competing with the Islamists for the hearts and minds of the electorate.
>Polls suggest that 70% of voters might still elect Gul president if Erdogan
>succeeds in changing the constitution so that the president can be elected
>directly. Any protest from the secularists against this evident popular
>will sounds irrational and undemocratic.
>
>The second pillar is the improvement of the economy. No one can deny that
>when the secular parties were in power, the Turkish economy was in tatters.
>Since Erdogan took office, growth has been strong, with inflation down and
>foreign investment high.
>
>The third pillar is taking control of two types of institutions in a
>democracy: those designed to educate civilians (education and media) and
>those designed to keep law and order (police, justice and the secret
>service).
>
>After an initial attempt at Islamic revolution failed in 1997, when the
>military engineered a "soft coup" against elected Islamists, Erdogan and
>his party understood that gradualism would yield more lasting power. They
>surely realize that Islamizing Turkey entirely is possible only if they
>gain control of the army and the Constitutional Court, the two institutions
>that have helped preserve Turkey's secular state.
>
>The recent Constitutional Court ruling annulling the nomination of Gul for
>the presidency, after the military warned that it is the guardian of
>secularism, is only a temporary setback for the Islamists. Erdogan and Gul
>have another trick up their sleeves.
>
>If they show the same restraint and patience that have brought them this
>far, they may achieve their aim by continuing to court membership in the
>European Union. Well-meaning but naive European leaders were manipulated by
>the ruling Islamists into saying that Turkey's army should be placed under
>civil control, like all armies in EU member states.
>
>In hindsight, Turkey's secular liberals have only themselves to blame. They
>underestimated the power of Dawa, they failed at growing the economy and
>they have not realized that members of the EU have been manipulated.
>
>An important trait of liberalism, however, is the opportunity to learn by
>trial and error. Turkish secular liberals must start their own grass-roots
>movement, one with the message of individual freedom. They must restore the
>confidence of the electorate in entrusting Turkey's economy to them, and
>they must reconquer the institutions of education, information, police and
>justice.
>
>They must also make EU leaders understand and respect the fact that the
>army and the Constitutional Court - besides defending the country and the
>constitution - are also, and maybe even more important, designed to protect
>Turkish democracy from Islam.
>
>Bringing back true secularism does not mean just any secularism. It means
>secularism that protects individual freedoms and rights, not the
>ultra-nationalist kind that breeds an environment in which Adolf Hitler's
>"Mein Kampf" is a bestseller, the Armenian genocide is denied and
>minorities are persecuted. Hrant Dink, the Armenian editor, was murdered by
>such a nationalist.
>
>It is this mix of virulent nationalism and predatory Islam in Turkey that
>makes the challenge for Turkish secular liberals greater than for any other
>liberal movement today.
>
>Okumanizi
>tavsiye ederim..
>
>Can secular Turkey survive democracy?
>How reformists can stop the Islamists who have chipped away at Turkey's
>secularism.
>By Ayaan Hirsi Ali, AYAAN HIRSI ALI, a former Dutch legislator and women's
>activist who now lives in the U.S., recently published her memoir,
>"Infidel."
>May 9, 2007
>
>
>SECULAR AND LIBERAL Turks have had a rude awakening from years of deep
>slumber. Kemal Ataturk's heritage is about to be destroyed - not by an
>invading power but from within, by fellow Turks who yearn for an Islamic
>state.
>
>Ever since Ataturk, Turkey has been divided into those who want to run
>state affairs on Islamic principles and those who want to keep Allah's will
>from the public space.
>
>The proponents of Islam in government, such as Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
>Erdogan, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul and their Justice and Development
>Party, have been remarkably successful. They have exploited the fact that
>you can use democratic means to erode democracy, employing a powerful
>strategy.
>
>Three pillars of that strategy are worth discussion.
>
>The first is Dawa, a tactic inspired by Islam's founder, Muhammad. Dawa
>means to preach Islam as a way of life, including a way of government,
>perpetually and with conviction. Every convert is obligated to preach Islam
>to others, creating a grass-roots movement.
>
>The secularists in Turkey underestimated this pillar and thus neglected
>competing with the Islamists for the hearts and minds of the electorate.
>Polls suggest that 70% of voters might still elect Gul president if Erdogan
>succeeds in changing the constitution so that the president can be elected
>directly. Any protest from the secularists against this evident popular
>will sounds irrational and undemocratic.
>
>The second pillar is the improvement of the economy. No one can deny that
>when the secular parties were in power, the Turkish economy was in tatters.
>Since Erdogan took office, growth has been strong, with inflation down and
>foreign investment high.
>
>The third pillar is taking control of two types of institutions in a
>democracy: those designed to educate civilians (education and media) and
>those designed to keep law and order (police, justice and the secret
>service).
>
>After an initial attempt at Islamic revolution failed in 1997, when the
>military engineered a "soft coup" against elected Islamists, Erdogan and
>his party understood that gradualism would yield more lasting power. They
>surely realize that Islamizing Turkey entirely is possible only if they
>gain control of the army and the Constitutional Court, the two institutions
>that have helped preserve Turkey's secular state.
>
>The recent Constitutional Court ruling annulling the nomination of Gul for
>the presidency, after the military warned that it is the guardian of
>secularism, is only a temporary setback for the Islamists. Erdogan and Gul
>have another trick up their sleeves.
>
>If they show the same restraint and patience that have brought them this
>far, they may achieve their aim by continuing to court membership in the
>European Union. Well-meaning but naive European leaders were manipulated by
>the ruling Islamists into saying that Turkey's army should be placed under
>civil control, like all armies in EU member states.
>
>In hindsight, Turkey's secular liberals have only themselves to blame. They
>underestimated the power of Dawa, they failed at growing the economy and
>they have not realized that members of the EU have been manipulated.
>
>An important trait of liberalism, however, is the opportunity to learn by
>trial and error. Turkish secular liberals must start their own grass-roots
>movement, one with the message of individual freedom. They must restore the
>confidence of the electorate in entrusting Turkey's economy to them, and
>they must reconquer the institutions of education, information, police and
>justice.
>
>They must also make EU leaders understand and respect the fact that the
>army and the Constitutional Court - besides defending the country and the
>constitution - are also, and maybe even more important, designed to protect
>Turkish democracy from Islam.
>
>Bringing back true secularism does not mean just any secularism. It means
>secularism that protects individual freedoms and rights, not the
>ultra-nationalist kind that breeds an environment in which Adolf Hitler's
>"Mein Kampf" is a bestseller, the Armenian genocide is denied and
>minorities are persecuted. Hrant Dink, the Armenian editor, was murdered by
>such a nationalist.
>
>It is this mix of virulent nationalism and predatory Islam in Turkey that
>makes the challenge for Turkish secular liberals greater than for any other
>liberal movement today.
>